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Book Review

The English Awakening of Santi
Romano’s Ordinamento Giuridico:
a Review of The Legal Order1
ATA KASSAIAN2
MORE THAN A CENTURY after its frst publication, Santi Romano’s Ordinamento

Giuridico is fnally available to an English-speaking audience, as Te Legal Order
(TLO), thanks to Mariano Croce’s eforts in translating the work.
Ordinamento Giuridico is a seminal work of legal theory and a cornerstone
of legal pluralism and legal institutionalism. Romano was a professor of
Administrative Law at the genesis of a nascent Italian nation state grappling
with entrenched non-static institutions.3 From 1929 to 1944, Romano was the
President of the Council of State, Italy’s highest court for matters of administrative

1.

2.

3.

Santi Romano, Te Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) [translated by Marco Croce] [TLO].
Published as a part of Routledge Law and Politics: Continental Perspectives series, Croce’s
translation is complemented by a foreword from Martin Loughin and an afterthought by
the translator. Loughin’s foreword describes the evolving role of the state in the period from
the late 19th to the early 20th century, when industrialization and socio-political change
called for a rethinking of the state and state law. He also outlines legal theoretical currents
of positivist, evolutionary, and institutionalist schools of law as the backdrop to Romano’s
refections and work. Croce’s Afterword helps further situate Romano’s visionary defnition
of the law and engages in a critical analysis of TLO.
B.C.L./LL.B. McGill University. Te author is indebted to Filali Osman for introducing
him to Romano’s Legal Order, the late Rod Macdonald for showing the applications of legal
pluralism, Richard Haigh for his generosity in editing and substantially improving the initial
draft, and editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. Tis review was undertaken in a strictly
personal capacity and the author takes responsibility for any shortcomings or misstatements.
Romano, supra note 1 at 112.
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law.4 His scholarship and experience ofered him insight into resolving labour
disputes, adjudicating administrative conficts, and reconciling legal enactments
with social realities. In TLO, Romano acknowledges international law, the
Catholic Church, and organized crime as institutions with their own rules
outside the state’s legal system. Te strength of Romano’s theory is that it does
not ignore or modify facts to ft a defnition of the law; for Romano, it is the
conceptual framework that must be adjusted to accommodate realities, not the
other way around.5

I. PART I OF TLO: DECONSTRUCTING INCOHERENT
THEORIES OF THE LAW
Originally published in 1917, Part I of TLO starts with a deconstructionist
analysis of the legal theories popular at the time.6 Romano introduces defnitions
of the law and demonstrates their limits by exposing their inadequacies when
applied outside the specifc factual confnes in which they are typically used.
Having demonstrated the inconsistencies in these theories, Romano sets out
to fnd a coherent general defnition of the law. He eventually concludes that:
(1) law should be traced back to society; (2) law should involve order or rules;
and (3) law should not be viewed as a social phenomenon, but as “an entity in
its own right.”7
Romano’s frst target is the positivist idea of law as a body of enacted rules.
He illustrates the strength of this defnition by evoking a judge sifting through
statutes or edicts for a bedrock to support a judgment.8 Romano then goes on
to point out that the legislative process is imperfect and piece-meal, and that
inevitably, there will be statutes and regulations that contradict each other.
He concludes that defning law as the general body of rules is fawed and ignores
underlying principles.9 Tis is notably the case where there is incompatible
divergent administrative guidance on the same type of situation, emanating from
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

Ibid.
Ibid at 7.
Although Romano wrote the TLO decades before Derrida’s Writing and Diference, Part I of
the TLO is a great example of a deconstructionist analysis; it is worth mentioning that at the
time of publication of Jacques Derrida’s thesis, a French translation of Romano’s work was
not yet available; the frst French translation of the TLO was published in 1975. See Jacques
Derrida, L’Écriture et la Diférance (Seuil, 1967) at 409-29.
Romano, supra note 1 at 12-13.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 3-5.
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diferent equally authoritative sources. An early Canadian constitutional law
debate on the same issue concerned overlap between provincial and federal heads
of power, which was eventually resolved by the doctrine of paramountcy where,
in case of overlap of provincial and federal powers, federal legislation overrides
even compatible provincial legislation. Te principle of absurdity, which forms
part of Canada’s modern approach to statutory interpretation, gives currency to
Romano’s dismissal of absolutist positivism: absurdity allows a judge to ignore
the express wording of a legislation where it counteracts the object and purpose
of a larger legislative framework. Te fact that a legislative provision may be
intentionally ignored to uphold an unwritten “object and purpose” shows
that our legal system now accords with Romano’s understanding insofar as it
admits that to view the law as a body of enactments is to miss an important part
of the picture.
Romano then turns his attention to the moralist concept that the law is a
baseline for ethical behaviour, judging it to be “partly true and partly seriously
mistaken.”10 For Romano, the law “not only represents an amount of morality,
but also of economy, customs, technique.”11 It would be a fallacy to believe that
what the law contains is a minimum baseline of anything. Te fundamental
aspect of law is determined by the institution in which it is materialized, i.e.,
“the law is the vital principal of any institution, that which animates and holds
together the various elements that compose it.”12
Describing the law as indissociable from the “institution”—defned in
TLO as a community that goes beyond flial bonds and has a legal element—
Romano afrms that the “concept of institution and the concept of a legal order,
considered as a unity and as a whole, are absolutely identical.”13 Te norm then,
whether a statute, treaty,14 or judgment, becomes merely an expression of the law,
not its essence.15 Te idea that the law is the institution, and something diferent
from the sum of its rules, harkens back to Socrates’ “ideal of the law,” and his
unwillingness to frustrate a verdict against his own life, or the biblical idea that
“the letter [of the law] killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”16

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid at 22.
Ibid.
Ibid at 24.
Ibid at 16.
Ibid at 28.
Ibid at 47.
2 Corinthians 3:6.
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Having settled on “the institution,” as the simplest general defnition of the
law,17 Romano then sets out the criteria for what he considers to be an institution:
[I]n order for an institution to arise, the existence of persons connected to each
other through simple relationships is not enough, as there must be a closer and more
organic bond. Te formation of a social super-structure is required upon which not
only their distinct relationships, but also their own generic position depends, or that
sway them. Terefore, it is impossible to envisage an institution only composed of
two physical persons; for these will remain two individualities, unable to morph
into one.18

To qualify as an institution, the community or society must have an ordering efect
in social relations that goes beyond flial bonds or one-of interactions. Romano’s
institution—or legal order—is the very concept of “imagined order” which Yuval
Noah Hariri describes as the bond holding large human communities together
and allowing them to cooperate.19
Next, Romano presents the idea of relevance: a confict of laws rule of sorts,
for assessing how institutions interact.20 Romano’s relevance has many of the
hallmarks of Derrida’s diférance: just as Derrida’s diférance tells the critic that
meaning can only be deferred or understood through diference,21 for Romano,
it is through comparison and observation of interactions between legal orders –
their relevance to each other – that a jurist or observer can appreciate the nature
of a legal order.22 Trough relevance, one can also assess the extent to which an
administrative, judicial, or legislative decision may impact the broader legal or
social spectrum.

17. Romano, supra note 1 at 17-19.
18. Ibid at 32-33.
19. Yuval N Harari, Sapiens: a Brief History of Humankind (Harper, 2014) at 113. Another
theoretical concept that resembles Romano’s legal order or institution is Althusser’s concept
of an “ideological state apparatus,” with the distinction that a legal order includes non-state
and even anti-state institutions. For an analysis of ISAs, see Louis Althusser, “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)” in Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays (Monthly Review Press, 1971) 127 at 142-47, 166-76.
20. Romano, supra note 1 at 43.
21. Derrida, supra note 6 at 410.
22. Romano, supra note 1 at 43.
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II. PART II OF TLO: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
LEGAL ORDER
If Part I of TLO is a quest for a coherent general defnition of the law, Part II
shows the practical applications and uses of defning the law as the “legal order”
or “institution.”
Having underlined the multiplicity of legal orders,23 Romano provides
examples like international law,24 the Church,25 and organised crime26 as distinct,
non-state legal orders, each sovereign in its own realm. Tis sovereignty persists
even though subjects of a legal order may be simultaneously subject to another
legal order with contradicting rules. For example, a state legal order may
adopt rules pertaining to the use of Church assets or regulate behaviour of its
members in ways that may oppose tenets of ecclesiastic principals or Canon
Law. However, the internal hierarchy of the Church will remain intact despite
state interference with its assets or parishioners: any change to the Church’s legal
order must come from within.27 In fact, the historic strength of the Church’s
legal order is the main reason why Quebec’s civil code permits a judgment for
separation and support payments without divorce, thereby accommodating
separating spouses who feel compelled to honour the Catholic Church’s doctrine
of indissolubility of marriage.28
Romano provides a non-exhaustive list of diferent types of institutions
for illustrative purposes and to facilitate analysis.29 First, there are original
institutions, derivative institutions, and intermediate institutions. While a
derivative institution may be a product of an original institution, its relationship
to the original institution may be complementary, dependant, or antithetical.
Second, institutions may have a particular or a general purpose. Tird, the
constitutive parts of an institution have an impact on its reach and its relevance
to the outside world. Fourth, the level of complexity of an institution is also
an important factor, which often has a correlation to whether the institution is
an original, derivative, or intermediate institution. A more complex institution
such as a state may have a number of derivative institutions such as regional
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ibid at 50-51.
Ibid at 54.
Ibid at 55.
Ibid at 58.
Ibid at 57-58.
Arts 493-515 CCQ; AM Bilodeau, “Quelques aspects de l’infuence religieuse sur le droit de
la personne et de la famille au Québec” (1984) 15 RGD 573 at 586.
29. Romano, supra note 1 at 67-68.
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governments, municipalities, ministries, et cetera. Fifth, an institution can be
considered as “perfect” or “imperfect,” meaning it can be autonomous and
self-sustaining, or owe its existence to another perfect institution. Te dependence
of an institution on another may be positive or negative. Lastly, a legal order may
or may not have legal personality. Having legal personality elevates the status
of an institution and allows it to assert itself. Te signifcance of legal status
is captured well in the HBO series, Te Wire, for example, where Omar Little
rightfully draws parallels between a criminal defence lawyer who “robs drug
dealers” by charging exorbitant fees to defend them in court and his own criminal
operation of robbing them at gun point.30 Omar’s profession is illegal, however,
while a criminal defence lawyer is part of a professional order with legal status.
In addition to the broad categories above, Romano provides fve heads
of “relevance”: subordination, presupposition, mutual independence and
simultaneous reliance on a third legal order, and succession.31 Subordination
occurs where a legal order may be subordinated to another. An example of
this is the idea of paramountcy in Canadian constitutional law, requiring that
where a provincial and federal head of power legitimately occupying the same
space are in confict, the federal law should be given precedence. Romano also
gives the example of “soft” subordination, exemplifed by international law
“hovering” over the state legal order. Presupposition occurs where a legal order
takes the existence of another for granted. Presupposition does not necessarily
imply superiority or subordination: municipal law presupposes a broader
administrative legal order; a confederation presupposes constitutive states; and
supranational international institutions presuppose the existence of national legal
orders. Te third head of relevance is mutual independence and simultaneous
reliance on a third legal order. Romano cites the relationship of independent
states, within a broader international legal order, as an illustration of this. Te
state legal orders function independently, but there is a broader international
legal order that enables that peaceful co-existence. Next, spontaneous voluntary
subordination includes the ideas of judicial comity or forum non conveniens in
private international law as examples of where a legal order voluntarily submits
part of itself to another. Finally, succession arises where a legal order is subsumed
in another, but transforms it in the process.

30. Paul Owen, “Te Wire re-up: season two, episode six – Levy and Omar: who is the real
criminal?” (30 June 2009) online (video): <www.theguardian.com/media/organgrinder/2009/
jun/23/wire-television>.
31. Romano, supra note 1 at 70-71.
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Romano applies his analytical framework to concrete examples in order to
better understand the dynamics of public international law;32 the relationship
between the Church and state;33 and the intricate balance of factory production
and labour unions.34 One notable conclusion made by Romano is that non-state
legal orders may be more powerful and result in an individual having deference
to the whims of another person or entity, even though that individual may have
superior rights in law—superior rights that they choose not to invoke because of
powerful “social” forces.35 An example cited by Romano is a father who chooses
to pay a dowry for his daughter, even though it is illegal under Italian law.36

III. REVIEWER’S COMMENTS: PUTTING CROCE’S
TRANSLATION IN CONTEXT
Te infuence of Romano’s work permeates scholarship looking at institutional
evolution37 and reforms of complex systems involving multiple stakeholders,
institutions, and states.38
Despite the absence of an English translation, English-speaking legal scholars
have often made reference to Romano’s ideas, with some notable examples
catalogued in Filippo Fontanelli’s Santi Romano and L’ordinamento giurdico: Te
Relevance of a Forgotten Masterpiece for Contemporary International, Translational
and Global Legal Relations.39 However, the notable absence of any reference
to Romano’s work in recent anthologies of legal theory or legal philosophy

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid at 73-80.
Ibid at 80, 86, 90.
Ibid at 96-100.
Ibid at 98.
Ibid at 94.
Maria Adele Carrai, “It is not the end of History: Te Financing Institutions of the Belt
and Road Initiative and the Bretton Woods System” (2017) online: Transnational Dispute
Management <www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2471>.
38. Allison Christians & Stephen Shay, “General Report” in 102A Cahiers de Droit Fiscal
International: Assessing BEPS: Origins, Standards, and Responses 17 (International Fiscal
Association, 2017), online (pdf ): <dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33139067/102AGenReport.pdf>; Kim Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: Te Development of an Important
but Underappreciated International Tax Value” in Richard Krever & John G. Head, eds, Tax
Reform in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International, 2008).
39. Filipo Fontanelli, “Santi Romano and L’ordinamento giurdico: Te Relevance of a Forgotten
Masterpiece for Contemporary International, Translational and Global Legal Relations”
(2011) 2 TLT 67 at 70, n13.
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demonstrates the necessity of Croce’s endeavor.40 Croce’s translation joins the
ranks of prior eforts which rendered Romano’s work accessible in French,
German, Portuguese, and Spanish, and at last allows English-speakers to directly
engage with it as a primary source.
Given conceptual dissonance between English common law and continental
civil law, a review by a common law jurist familiar with civil law concepts and
terminology may help improve future editions of the translation. Consistently
using standard common law terminology for concepts such as “bodies corporate”,
“confict of laws rules”, “royal prerogative”, and “non-pecuniary obligations”,
where TLO presently uses phrases like “moral entities”41 “norm of collision”,42
“special power of supremacy”,43 and “obligations that do not have a patrimonial
character”44 would add clarity to the text. Additional footnotes may also be
helpful to update certain areas that have seen changes since Romano’s publication
of 1945.45 For those well-versed versed in the French language and familiar with
civil law concepts, the abridged translation and commentary by Jacques Bergé
may prove a good compliment to Croce’s translation.46

40. Although Romano’s work lends itself to the subject matter, it is not mentioned in either of
these recent legal survey publications: Oren Perez and Gunther Teubner eds, Paradoxes and
Inconsistencies in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2006); Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal
Teory 2nd Ed, (New York, 2004).
41. Romano, supra note 1 at 14.
42. Ibid at 85.
43. Ibid at 108.
44. Ibid at 105.
45. Te following passage is faithfully translated in the publication: “international law does not
have the power to deny the validity of the distinct ramifcations of the state order, which
is located in a diferent sphere, impermeable to international law.” TLO, supra note 1 at
70, §36. While this statement is true in certain jurisdictions, most jurisdictions, specifcally
monist jurisdictions such as Italy, have moved towards a model of direct application of
international law and a system of hierarchy of rules, an example of which is Arret Niccolo in
France. See CE, 20 October 1989, Raoul Georges Nicolo contre commissaire du gouverment
[1989] Rec 108243.
46. Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, Les ordres juridiques (Dalloz, 2015).
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IV. OVERCOMING THE ROMANO DILEMMA: THE CANADIAN
MISSING LINK
A frequent critique of Romano’s theory is its failure or reluctance to legitimise
the state legal order and to defne how norms come about and what distinguishes
mandatory and optional norms.47 Te absence of arguments posited to legitimise
the state legal order is known as the Romano dilemma.48 For Croce, there is no
theoretical resolution to the absence of attribution of legitimacy in Romano’s
theory. Croce sees Romano’s theory as a conceptual framework which allows jurists
to view and understand social phenomena through a legal lens. For Fontanelli,
legitimising the state or any legal order is irrelevant in the context of Romano’s
theory, as Romano views the creation of the legal order as a non-juridical process.49
In his Introduction to TLO, Martin Loughin posits that Romano was himself
cognizant of the fact that his theoretical framework does not address whether his
work is “a thesis on the plurality of legal orders in society or on the modern form
of law as a concrete-order,” saying that in a 1909 speech, “[Romano] recognized
that the challenge for the idea of the state as the ‘institution of institutions’ is that
of somehow being able to transcend these [non-state legal order] interests and
realize the common good.”50 Remarkably, the late Professor Patrick Glenn, when
concluding his odyssey surveying legal systems such as the civil law, common law,
Talmudic Law, Sharia, and other legal orders or traditions, concludes his grand
contribution to legal pluralist scholarship by saying that many or all of these legal
orders may co-exist in major cosmopolitan areas, and that despite “application

47. In this portion of the publication, Croce critically engages with Romano’s work. See Mariano
Croce, “Afterword: Te juristic point of view: an interpretive account of the Legal Order” in
Santi Romano, Te Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) 111 at 127.
48. Ibid at 128.
49. See Fontanelli, supra note 39 at 76. Fontanelli states:
Similarly, any investigation into the voluntarist commencement or foundation of the order
would be, according to Romano, a non-juridical attempt. As it follows, Romano’s legal order
is a static snapshot of the organisation, in which human voluntary action plays little role either
in supporting or changing the system; the latter, in turn, evolves spontaneously. Human action
and the norms regulating it are disregarded by Romano, whose equivalence between (static)
order and law echoes Hegel’s equivalence between reality and rationality.

50. Martin Loughlin, “Santi Romano and the institutional theory of law” in Santi Romano, Te
Legal Order (Routledge, 2017) xi at xxii [emphasis added].
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of non-state legal traditions to many questions of personal status, family law and
succession—the state, somehow, persists.”51
While this is not highlighted by Croce, Loughin, Fontanelli, or Bergé’s
commentaries, the late Professor Roderick A. Macdonald, who studied at
Osgoode Hall Law School and the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law
before going on to teach at the faculties of Law at both Windsor and McGill
universities, resolves this analytical conundrum by going back to the individual
and developing the notions of subjective-subjectivity and inter-normativity to
defne the norm-generative process: it is the individual who initiates, perpetuates,
or weakens a legal order by his or her individual actions.52 Te tapestry of the
legal orders supporting the many interactions and relationships within a society
is weaved by individual actions and decisions.
Macdonald’s critical legal pluralism compliments Romano’s legal order.
Whereas Romano allows us to grasp a detailed snapshot of the various legal
orders afecting or infuencing a specifc action or transaction, Macdonald
legitimises those legal orders and demystifes the norm generative process
through subjective-subjectivity (the idea that a subject of a legal order opts to
subject herself to a rule or legal order; hence subjection to a rule or legal order is
a subjective choice made at the individual level) and internormativity (the idea
that an individual will be confronted with competing demands from diferent
norms emanating from separate legal orders to which they are simultaneously
subject;53 internormativity can also be seen as the micro-equivalent to relevance
in Romano’s macro framework). Macdonald’s article exposing informal
associations between former and current camp managers, whom he refers to
51. Patrick H Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 365
[emphasis added].
52. Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A Macdonald, “What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism”
(1997) 12 CJLS 25.
53. Roderick A Macdonald, “Custom Made-For a Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism”
(2011) 26 CJLS 301 at 324:
Our normative commitments thus vary depending on our various confgurations of self, which
is shaped and informed by our personal motivations, bonds to others, institutional afliations,
and identity markers. Each of these aspects of our selves, the plurality of identities we “live by,” is
variably ascribed by ourselves and also prescribed by others to varying degrees. Individuals may
feel bound to a web of multiple, sometimes conficting legal regimes, whether by virtue of their
afliations with various social groups, by their own individual normative standards, through
their interaction with institutions (families, clubs, churches, schools, self-regulating bodies,
corporations, communities, etc.) that refect, reinforce, and implement these standards. Law
emerges, then, through these interactions and relationships and not through coercive means.
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as the Vielle Garde,54 is a good example of how going back to the individual
provides a concrete demonstration of how a legal order is legitimised and evolves
through subjective-subjectivity. Te state persists because of the complex web of
relationships of individuals across legal orders who subjectively subject themselves
to the state legal order when bargaining their allegiances to diferent legal orders:
A critical legal pluralism presumes that legal subjects hold each of their multiple
narrating selves up to the scrutiny of each of their other narrating selves, and up to
the scrutiny of all the other narrated selves projected upon them by others. Te self
is the irreducible site of normativity and internormativity. And the very idea of law
must be autobiographical.55

Macdonald’s work in improving the administrative process,56 harmonizing the
law of secured transactions,57 and developing new ways of teaching the law58
is a testament to the enabling efect of pragmatically and objectively applying
Romano’s framework to understand “the law,” while remembering the potential
of the individual who lies within, at the centre of the interlocking web of legal
orders vying for their allegiance.

V. ENDURING RELEVANCE
Romano’s defnition of the law allows actors involved at diferent levels, be it rule
setters, adjudicators, subjects, or would-be disrupters, to understand the rules of
the game or system. It enables actors to identify the legal orders at play and to
judge the relevance of such legal orders, facilitating a decision.
54. Roderick A Macdonald, “Les Vieilles Gardes. Hypothèses sur l’émergence des normes,
l’internormativité et le désordre à travers une typologie des institutions normatives” in JG
Belley, ed, Le droit soluble: Contributions québécoises à l’étude de l’internormativité (Librairie
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1996) at 233-72.
55. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 52 at 46.
56. Macdonald was involved with public inquiries such as the Canadian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission and the Quebec Charbonneau Commission. Macdonald’s
contributions in diferent areas are also catalogued in: Andrée Lajoie, “La vie intellectuelle de
Roderick Macdonald: un engagement” (Les Éditions Témis, 2014); Te Unbounded Level of
the Mind: Rod Macdonald’s Legal Imagination (McGill University, 7 February 2014) online:
<www.mcgill.ca/macdonald-symposium>
57. MacDonald worked on the Québec civil law of hypothecation, UCC Article 9, and UN
eforts at a model law of personal property.
58. Tis includes the very creation of a successful “transsystemic” and “bilingual” program
of legal education at McGill University. See also Roderick A Macdonald, “Curricular
Development in the 1980s: A Perspective” (1982) 32 J Legal Educ 569, cited in Natasha
Bakht & et al, “Counting Outsiders: a Critical Exploration of Outsider Course Enrollment
in Canadian Legal Education” 45 OHLJ 667 at 669, n2.
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From a legal perspective, Romano’s analytical framework is very suitable
for helping a lawyer decide the remedy to seek for a client when presented
with more than one option, including remedies in common law or equity. Te
analytical framework would prove useful to the Chief Compliance Ofcer of an
international bank grappling with implementation of novel regulations such as
GDPR, inviting them to refect on their business lines, geographical areas, and
clientele. Awareness of the multiplicity of legal orders and types of relevance is
also helpful to businesses raising capital, in that it opens facets such as client
perception, economic outlook, and scrutiny from regulators when grappling
with the choice of a public or private ofering, traditional debt or equity, or more
novel means such as a coin ofering or crowd funding. It also provides a frame of
reference for moderators of a U.S.-based social networking platform, for instance,
when faced with competing legally sound arguments of allowing all speech based
on the U.S. Constitution’s unfettered understanding of what constitutes free
speech on the one hand, and their duty of care as a privately owned platform to
third parties or individuals that are targeted by their users.
Romano’s defnition of the law and his framework for assessing relationships
between legal orders also enhances the reader’s ability to rise to new challenges
outside of the judicial context. With new realities such as the rise of artifcial
intelligence and the gig economy, TLO would help regulators, actors, and
entrepreneurs to distinguish between open and closed systems as well as provide
tools to predict interactions between multiple open or closed systems.59 Te great
strength of Romano’s thesis is the fact that it does not willfully ignore the presence
of non-ofcial or “immoral” institutions, nor does it dismiss them as irrelevant.
His aim is not to automatically legitimize a state or a “natural” or “divine” legal
order.60 Rather Romano provides tools to identify systems and their (unspoken)
rules—or essence—as well as an analytical framework to assess how they interact.
Tanks to Croce’s endeavor, Romano’s foundational contribution to pluralist
and institutionalist legal thought is now available to an English-speaking audience,

59. Speaking on the topic of artifcial intelligence and human job redundancy, Garry Kasparov
underlined the importance of distinguishing between open and closed systems, and
how artifcial intelligence excels in the latter but struggles with the former. See “Te
Future of Everything Festival: Garry Kasparov on AI Making Us Free” (10 May 2018)
at 00:05m, online (podcast): WSJ’s Te Future of Everything <www.wsj.com/podcasts/
wsj-the-future-of-everything/the-future-of-everything-festival-garry-kasparov-on-ai-makingus-free/4190b7f2-97b4-4e81-ae70-b803a0d37ed6>.
60. Romano, supra note 1 at 96.
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putting an end to what Jan Paulsson called a “scandal of intellectual history.”61
TLO is indispensable for law students, legal scholars, judges, and lawyers who
seek a general meaning of the law that goes beyond legal disciplines. It is also
of great value to anyone looking for an analytical framework that would help
identify the laws or rules at play in specifc contexts as well as the ways in which
they relate to each other.

61. Jan Paulsson, “Unlawful Laws and the Authority of International Tribunals” (Lalive Lecture
delivered at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Geneva, 27 May
2009), (2008) 23 Foreign Investment LJ 215 at 217.

